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Post-apartheid South Africa has gone from being a good international citizen to defending a
number of authoritarian regimes and obstructing various international initiatives aimed at
strengthening the global human rights regime. This article presents this slide as a move from a
‘liberal’ foreign policy to a ‘liberationist’ one and emphasises the external sources of this shift,
particularly the influence of the rest of Africa and a rising China.
Introduction
Upon its democratisation, South Africa quickly occupied a very different position in
the international order from that during apartheid. Whereas the apartheid regime
was belligerent and internationally isolated, post-apartheid South Africa turned out
to be a peace-maker, a keen multilateralist and a spokesperson for Africa and the
developing world. Initially, democratic South Africa explicitly placed moral consid-
erations at the heart of its international relations. Unfortunately, such moral recti-
tude soon dissipated. It was not unexpected that South Africa would before long
put self-interest above moral considerations, but what was surprising was how
often South Africa started defending oppressive governments and obstructing inter-
national efforts to strengthen the international human rights regime.
This article depicts post-apartheid South Africa’s slide from good international
citizen to a ‘rogue democracy’ (Washington Post, 2008) over the past 20 years,
emphasising the external forces that have pushed the country in this direction.
South Africa’s moral decline is characterised as going from a liberal identity to one
described as ‘liberationist’. The two positions can be opposed along five dimensions.
First, a liberal insists on liberal democracy, whereas the liberationist permits the
curtailment or postponement of democratic freedoms for the sake of political
stability or economic development. Second, the liberal sees human rights as uni-
versal, while, for the liberationist, national sovereignty trumps universal human
rights when these two conflict. Third, a liberal largely accepts the current, Western-
dominated world order, whereas a liberationist is anti-Western, wants to counter-
balance the West and strongly identifies with the developing world. Fourth,
whereas a liberal aspires to deracinated human relations and universal agreement
on moral questions, the liberationist sees racial and cultural relations as antagonistic
and fraught with hierarchy, power and skewed representations, and motivates an
insistence on the equal worth of non-Western cultures. Fifth, liberals broadly accept
the current neoliberal economic order; at most they seek a consistent application of
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global economic rules and more concern for the poor. Liberationists desire a radi-
cally different order. Although they have trouble saying what this order should look
like, it would be much more amenable to the interests of developing countries. At
the domestic level, liberals give as much scope as possible to the free market,
whereas liberationists prefer greater state involvement in the economy.
While it is possible to be a liberal on some dimensions and liberationist on others,
the first four elements, which are political in nature, typically go together. Where
one stands on the four political aspects only weakly predicts where one will stand
on the fifth, economic dimension. The liberal approach is, to adopt loosely Robert
Cox’s terms, ‘problem-solving’, for it does not put in question the power relations
that underpin the international order or how this order came into existence and
therefore finds most support from states that benefit most from the status quo, that
is, the industrialised states of the West. By contrast, the liberationist approach
enjoys more support among developing countries. With its origins in dependency
theory, Marxism and the anti-colonial movement, the liberationist approach offers
a ‘critical’ perspective because it asks how international order and the power
relations that underpin it came about and seeks to identify ways in which this order
is changing or can be changed (Cox, 1996, pp. 87–90).
Below, the internal and external influences that shape South African foreign
policy are presented. Particular emphasis is placed on the constraints that other
African countries place on South African foreign policy. The main section consists
of a depiction of the alleged shift in South Africa’s foreign policy, organised
in terms of movement along the five dimensions of the liberal–liberationist
distinction.
From good international citizen to ‘rogue democracy’
Although South African foreign policy continues to be shaped by both liberal and
liberationist ideas (Evans, 1999), the African National Congress (ANC) government
has increasingly moved in a liberationist direction on the above-mentioned four
political dimensions. It has, however, embraced a liberal position on the fifth,
economic dimension. On occasion, liberal and liberationist tendencies move in the
same direction, for example promoting democracy or doing peacekeeping in Africa,
yet, when these two approaches come into conflict, South Africa repeatedly falls to
the liberationist side.
As is frequently noted, foreign policymaking in South Africa is highly centralised and
dominated by the executive (Alden and Le Pere, 2004, pp. 283–287; Van Nieuwkerk,
2006, p. 49). The country’s second democratic president, Thabo Mbeki, played a
significant role in shifting South Africa in a liberationist direction, a foreign policy
path that is likely to continue under the current president, Jacob Zuma. The
executive’s task is made easier by the growing liberationist sympathies within the
ANC, the weakness of opposition parties and the re-racialisation of South African
politics. However, the continuing presence of both liberal and liberationist values in
South Africa means that the makers of foreign policy can find domestic support for
either direction. More significant constraints on South Africa’s foreign policy lie in its
international relations and its position in a changing world order. In this regard,
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 83
© 2010 The Author. Politics © 2010 Political Studies Association
POLITICS: 2010 VOL 30(S1)
South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa and the rise of China are particularly
important.
South Africa wants to be a leader of the developing world and of Africa in particu-
lar. Fortunately for South Africa, the rest of the world also regards the country as
a leader. South Africa’s standing is suggested by: frequent invitations to G8
summits; that it is the only African member of the G20; and that it has been chair
of the African Union, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Southern
African Development Community (SADC), the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In
particular, industrialised states see South Africa as an important partner in address-
ing Africa’s many problems.
South Africa’s international leadership, however, depends on support from the rest
of Africa and it therefore has to avoid being seen as pushy and a lackey of the West
(Hamill and Lee, 2001, p. 49). South Africa’s balancing act is complicated by the fact
that African countries are generally worse governed and less democratic and
respectful of human rights than itself. South Africa is also expected to subscribe to
the norm that African leaders should remain united and not criticise each other
(Clapham, 1996, pp. 106–132). Moreover, South Africa also has to smooth over its
unequal economic relationship with the rest of Africa and make its support for a
neoliberal economic agenda more palatable. Liberationist actions and posturing
buys South Africa some credibility as a leader and deepens solidarity with Africa
and the rest of the developing world. Such solidarity helps to obscure South Africa’s
unequal economic relationship with the rest of Africa and creates the sense that
neoliberal policies are in the continent’s interest.
China, in its hunger for natural resources, has become one of the continent’s
leading trading partners, investors and creditors (Alden, 2007, p. 14). Moreover,
China, unlike the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, does not
impose political conditions on its loans or investments. South Africa, which is
expected to insist on good governance and respect for human rights from other
African governments but has relatively little of material value to use as leverage,
thus has to compete for influence in Africa with a country that has much to offer
of immediate and tangible value and that refrains from trying to make other
countries more democratic. China’s growing presence in Africa thus forces South
Africa, in so far as it wants to maintain a following among other African countries,
into defending their sovereignty and relying on liberationist arguments to cover its
retreat from liberal principles.
Before I discuss the five dimensions of South Africa’s movement in a liberationist
direction, it should be noted that multilateralism has been a prominent feature of
post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy (Lee, Taylor and Williams, 2006).
Multilateralism makes sense for a middle power such as South Africa, because it
allows for the pooling of resources, sharing of information and lowering of costs;
establishes greater order and predictability in the international system; and presents
a forum for persuading others of one’s point of view. In the African context, South
Africa is able to mitigate the impression that it is acting as a regional hegemon by
directing its efforts through multilateral channels. Strengthening multilateral insti-
tutions on the continent also serves to deepen the integration between South Africa
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and the rest of the continent. At the global level, Cox has argued that multilateral
institutions are conservative in that they serve to legitimise the current hegemonic
order. However, as Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (2006, p. 5) point out, it is also
possible to use multilateral institutions to challenge the hegemonic order, as indeed
South Africa has done, by, for example, defending regimes that the West finds
unpalatable and campaigning to reform the UN Security Council in the interests of
developing countries.
Support for democracy
The first dimension along which it is possible to see South Africa’s movement from
liberalism to a liberationist position is in its support for the international promotion
of democracy. In a 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, Nelson Mandela (1993, p. 88)
conveyed the ANC’s commitment to the international promotion of democracy
because ‘[o]nly true democracy can guarantee rights’. However, already by 1997,
the ANC (1997) began to downplay the importance of promoting democracy
internationally. South Africa also started equating democracy with a relatively
well-run polling day, with little regard for what happens in the period before an
election. Political stability has become more important to South Africa, especially if
we consider the regional consequences of a civil war in Zimbabwe. Hence, South
Africa has consistently sided with the incumbent in cases where there was the
possibility that continuing conflict with its domestic opponents might lead to
political instability. South Africa has thus readily given its stamp of approval to
highly dubious polls, such as the 2007 elections in Nigeria and various elections in
Zimbabwe. Moreover, South Africa refrains from criticising elections elsewhere in
the world and usually reserves comment for when a change of government takes
place through something as blatant as a coup.
In 2001, South Africa seemed to have won the commitment of African govern-
ments to greater levels of democracy by getting African countries to sign up to
Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). A key element of
NEPAD was to be the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whereby, or so it
seemed initially, African countries would assess the levels of democracy in those
that signed up for peer review and then mete out punishment to those that were
not democratic enough. However, such hope was soon waylaid, as Mbeki (2002, p.
2) wrote that peer review would be ‘non-adversarial’ and entail assessment, rec-
ommendation and informal dialogue among peers (see also Taylor, 2005, pp.
64–74). Indeed, when Rwanda, which Freedom House classified (and still classifies)
as ‘not free’, became one of the first countries to pass its peer review, it showed that
the APRM was toothless (Jordaan, 2007).
Sovereignty versus human rights
As with democracy, the above-mentioned article by Mandela announced South
Africa’s commitment to human rights, promising that ‘[h]uman rights will be the
light that guides our foreign affairs’ (Mandela, 1993, p. 88). Initially, South Africa
lived up to its stated intentions. Mandela spoke up for the Kurds, the people of
Western Sahara, the East Timorese and the Palestinians. South Africa played an
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important role in establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Nel, Taylor
and Van der Westhuizen, 2001, p. 1); it tried to negotiate peace deals in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, even in Northern Ireland and between Israel and
the Palestinians, and later in Burundi, Sudan and the Ivory Coast. Significantly, in
1997, South Africa refused to block a UN Human Rights Commission (HRC)
resolution that condemned China’s human rights record (Cornelissen, 2006, p. 39).
One of the most formative events in South Africa’s relationship with Africa took
place at the 1995 Commonwealth meeting. During the summit, news arrived that
despite countless international appeals for clemency, the Abacha regime in Nigeria
had executed nine activists from the country’s troubled Niger Delta region.
Mandela called for sanctions against Nigeria and its suspension from the Common-
wealth. Although Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth, Mandela’s calls
for sanctions went unheeded. Mandela’s condemnation of Nigeria was almost
unheard of among African leaders, as was insinuated by Nigeria’s response which
referred to South Africa as ‘a white state with a black head’ (quoted in Barber, 2005,
p. 1084) and was explicitly stated by the aptly named Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), which described Mandela’s actions as ‘not an African way to deal with an
African problem’ (quoted in Vale and Maseko, 1998, p. 272). In the aftermath of
this episode, Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president of South Africa, argued that in
this case understanding would have been better than confrontation. In liberationist
fashion, Mbeki then moved the focus away from Nigeria by blaming the West for
manipulating Mandela (Barber, 2005, p. 1084). A few months later, the limits that
the rest of Africa placed on South Africa’s ability to pursue a liberal normative
agenda became visible when, at a meeting of the HRC, South Africa helped to dilute
a resolution on Nigeria in an effort to obtain as much African support as possible
(Black, 2003, p. 42).
More recently, in 2009, the controversy surrounding an ICC arrest warrant for
Sudanese president Omar-al-Bashir on charges of war crimes showed how Africa
constrained South Africa’s foreign policy. The ICC sought al-Bashir’s immediate
arrest, while the majority of African Union (AU) members rejected the ICC arrest
warrant. South Africa did not want al-Bashir to enjoy impunity, but also did not
want to alienate its fellow AU members. South Africa took the lead in the search for
a compromise and thus tried to convince the ICC to postpone its indictment of
al-Bashir for one year (Mail and Guardian, 2009).
Following the Nigeria episode, human rights began to occupy a lesser importance in
South African foreign policy. However, what was unexpected was that South Africa
would quickly move from being a defender of human rights to a defender of human
rights abusers. South Africa started using multilateral institutions to challenge the
West and to shield various human rights abusers. In 2007, South Africa voted
against a UN Security Council resolution condemning human rights abuses in
Burma, arguing that the matter should be dealt with by the HRC. In 2007, as
international concerns grew over Iran’s nuclear programme, South Africa defended
Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop a peaceful nuclear programme at the UN. In
recent years, South Africa has declined to support key UN resolutions on human
rights abuses in Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe; voted down a UN General
Assembly resolution to condemn the use of rape and sexual abuse as a military or
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political tactic; refused to support a UN declaration that called for the decriminali-
sation of homosexuality (even though gay marriage is legal in South Africa); and,
in 2003, even campaigned for the election of Libya as chair of the HRC (Cornelissen,
2006, p. 39). South Africa, whose democratisation owes much to international
pressure on the apartheid regime and support for the ANC during apartheid, no
longer speaks up for the liberation struggles in Western Sahara and Tibet and has
remained silent about the ongoing authoritarian abuses in Burma, even though
Burma, when it was still democratic, was vocal in its opposition to apartheid
(Boggert, 2008). Rather than defend victims of human rights abuses, as democratic
South Africa set out to do, or defend other liberation movements, as South Africa
still does for Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF, the principle at work seems to
be that South Africa reserves its solidarity for the incumbent rulers of all developing
countries, no matter how they rule, a sentiment that is even stronger towards other
African regimes.
Support for the international order
A liberal position is identified as accepting of the current, still Western-dominated
world order, whereas a liberationist position is anti-Western, seeks a counterweight
to the West and strongly identifies with the developing world. On political matters
South Africa’s loyalty has moved towards the developing world. At the UN, for
example, South Africa has made it plain that it wanted to counter the ‘imbalance of
global power’ that exists in the UN Security Council (Washington Post, 2007).
Although South Africa has not used the G8 summits to which it has been invited to
challenge the current balance of power, it continues to seek a realignment of power
in international relations. South Africa’s involvement in the Non-Aligned Move-
ment and the more recently created India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum
should be understood as weak, initial efforts towards realignment.
Race and identity in international relations
While a liberal believes it possible and desirable to suspend one’s racial and cultural
identity to achieve universal standards of judgement and morality, a liberationist
perspective views such universality as a disguised Western perspective; regards
cultural and racial relations as more antagonistic than liberals admit; and tends to
view morality and justice as rooted in particular communities. Initially post-
apartheid South Africa assumed a strongly liberal stance. The ANC had based its
campaign against apartheid on a universalist vision of a non-racial South Africa in
which all people would enjoy political and legal equality. During Mandela’s presi-
dency, racial fears were played down.
Mbeki, his successor, however, constantly injected race and assertions of African
identity into South Africa’s local politics and foreign relations. Already in 1996,
Mbeki proclaimed ‘I am an African!’, thereby asserting his identity as a black man
in South Africa, but, more importantly, his connection to the rest of Africa. This
stronger sense of its Africanness led to South Africa’s increased involvement in the
continent’s problems. Mbeki started sending South African peacekeeping troops to
various conflicts in Africa and personally tried to negotiate peace deals. Mbeki
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tirelessly campaigned for debt relief and increased aid for Africa’s poorest countries.
In 1997, Mbeki announced an ‘African Renaissance’, which remained ‘more
promise than policy’ (Vale and Maseko, 1998, p. 276). More significantly, Mbeki
was the principal force behind NEPAD, an elaborate proposal that committed
African leaders to solving Africa’s problems. South Africa further threw its weight
behind various multilateral bodies on the continent, such as SADC and the newly
established African Union.
Stronger identification with Africa, however, also brought certain problems, such as
acceptance of the habit that African leaders respect the sovereignty of others to the
point of not criticising each other. So strong was South Africa’s solidarity with other
African leaders and its respect for the sovereignty principle that when the United
States challenged the Mugabe regime, which by 2008 had become openly murder-
ous, Mbeki wrote a scathing letter to US President George W. Bush in which he told
him to ‘butt out’ and to respect the views of the Zimbabwean people (Washington
Post, 2008). Mbeki’s disdain for what he saw as Western arrogance also seems to
have pushed him into a confused and dangerous AIDS policy at home, which saw
the belittling of (Western) medicine and science and the promotion of traditional
medicines such as beetroot and garlic as treatment for the illness. Although South
Africa’s closer association with Africa has benefited the continent, the country’s
new-found loyalty has unhinged the ability of its leaders to recognise the home-
grown causes of Africa’s problems and accept legitimate criticism from the West.
Acceptance of the international economic order
While South Africa has moved in a liberationist direction on political matters, it has
not done so in the economic realm. Liberals accept neoliberal globalisation,
although some might seek greater consistency in the application of global economic
rules and more care for the world’s poorest. Liberationists, by contrast, desire a
radically different economic order, but have trouble describing such an order. Upon
assuming power, many expected that the ANC would opt for strongly interven-
tionist and redistributive economic policies, considering that the party’s supporters
were mostly poor blacks in an extremely unequal society, that its allies all lay to the
left and that, before assuming power, it had promised a redistribution of wealth.
However, after initial hesitation, the ANC announced its embrace of neoliberalism
with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. South Africa
soon began converting others to its economic vision. The South Africa-driven
blueprint for Africa’s economic recovery, NEPAD, stressed Africa’s commitment to
market liberalisation and continental economic integration. At the World Trade
Organization (WTO), South Africa assumed an active role as a bridge-builder
between North and South, although in practice this has meant that ‘South Africa
works with the South to try to get them to go along with the demands from the
major powers’ (Lee, 2006, p. 57).
While South Africa has refrained from questioning the foundations upon which the
neoliberal order has been built, it has tried to soften its edges, by seeking debt relief
and more aid and investment for poorer countries (Hamill, 2006, p. 124). At the
IMF, South Africa has campaigned for a change to the institution’s voting rules in
favour of developing countries. The country’s former finance minister, Trevor
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Manuel, is currently the chair of the IMF committee charged with its reform. At the
WTO, South Africa has not entirely been a pawn of the powerful states, demanding
that Western governments adhere to the free trade doctrine they espouse; specifi-
cally, that they accept the liberalisation of their agricultural markets. Still, South
Africa’s embrace of free trade has caused tensions with its economically less
advanced African neighbours, but with millions of poor people of its own, it looks
set to exploit its regional economic superiority and seek further liberalisation and
integration of African economies.
Conclusion
South Africa continues to derive influence from being the most developed country
in Africa. Shortly after becoming democratic, South African foreign policy was able
to ‘punch above its weight’ and on occasion go against the liberal wishes of the
major Western powers because it possessed a moral authority that derived from the
stature of Nelson Mandela, the virtuousness of the ANC, the exemplary nature of
South Africa’s democratic transition and the country’s unilateral dismantling of its
nuclear arsenal. However, these sources of moral authority are no longer available:
Mandela has withdrawn from politics; there are daily newspaper reports of corrup-
tion by ANC officials; and the country has gradually become politically less free,
according to Freedom House. South Africa’s lapsed moral authority means that it is
less able to stand alone and that building consensus through multilateral organi-
sations will assume even greater prominence in the country’s pursuit of its goals.
The elements designated here as liberal are Western in origin and approximate
universal values. However, as the power of the West declines, its hold over South
Africa decreases. Moreover, the shift in international power from West to East is
prying the world’s most important multilateral institutions loose from the powers
that created them, thus offering the developing world more room to contest the
direction of its governance. Although South Africa continues to support interna-
tional economic institutions, such as the WTO, in roughly its current form, the
country is at the forefront of the struggle to reshape the international political order.
Whether one would welcome the likely direction of such reshaping depends on
whether one agrees with the values that underpin the liberationist vision.
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